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Finance, Discipline and the Labour
Share in the Long-Run: France
(1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–2000)
Giorgos Gouzoulis
Abstract
There is an ongoing debate within political economy on how finance affects
capital–labour relations. Industrial relation scholars have demonstrated that
financialization empowers capital and induces the liberalization of industrial
relations. Additionally, meso and macro level studies show that finance reduced
the labour share during neoliberalism.However, the literature is relatively limited
and does not extend to the pre-WWII period. Considering finance as historically
integral to capitalism, this paper estimates the impact of finance on the labour
shares of France (1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–2000). The results show
that mortgage debt decreases the labour shares of both countries, thus, the
financialization of households induces industrial discipline historically. However,
the negative effect is substantially smaller in Sweden where housing finance is
state-led and bargaining coordination is centralized over the last century.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the study of the neoliberal finance-dominated regime is
gaining prominence among social scientists (van der Zwan 2014) who
explore how the rise of finance has been affecting capital–labour relations
and macroeconomic performance since the early 1980s (Froud et al. 2000;
Gospel and Pendleton 2003; Krippner 2005; Stockhammer 2004). Despite
quantitative macroeconomic history studies provide evidence that finance has
been integral to capitalism since the mid-nineteenth century (Blackwell and
Kohl, 2018, 2019; Jordà et al. 2017), much of the literature analyses the
rise of finance as a particular aspect of neoliberalism, focusing myopically
on the post-1980s experience and mainly on the Anglo-Saxon economies
(Christophers 2015; van der Zwan 2014). Inspired by the growing historical
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literature, this paper goes beyond the neoliberalism-biased interpretation of
finance and looks at how different varieties of financial systems affected
functional income distribution since the late nineteenth century.
A strand of the empirical finance literature has focused on whether it
has contributed to worsening employment relations and the reduction in the
labour shares, which is a stylized fact of the last four decades (IMF 2017;
Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014). Köhler et al. (2019) outline four channels
through which the rise of finance since the early 1980s affected the bargaining
power of labour and its income share: (a) rising household indebtedness
(Argitis and Dafermos 2013; Froud et al. 2002; Langley 2007; Wood 2017);
(b) enhanced exit options for firms due to financial liberalization; (c) the rise
of shareholder value orientation (Froud et al. 2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan
2000); and (d) increasing financial overhead costs (Argitis and Dafermos
2013; Hein 2007). Industrial relation scholars, such as Gospel and Pendleton
(2003), Palpacuer et al. (2011) and Appelbaum et al. (2013)„ Thompson
(2003) have demonstrated that finance has transformed the objectives of
corporate governance and induced the liberalization of employment relations.
Ultimately, at themeso andmacro level, this resulted in finance contributing to
the steep fall in labour shares since the 1970s (Alvarez 2015; Dünhaupt 2017;
Guschanski and Onaran 2018; Köhler et al. 2019; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey
2013; Stockhammer 2017; Wood 2017). However, the impact of finance on
labour relations and functional income inequality has not yet been examined
in the historical context.
The present paper fills this gap in the literature by estimating the
determinants of the labour share for France (1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–
2000). My strategy is mainly exploratory and based on a macro-level, case-
based comparative analysis. The objective is to explore: first, whether finance
has been influencing the evolution of the labour share since the late nineteenth
century; second, whether the effects of finance on the wage share are weaker
in countries with state-led housing finance systems (Johansson 1938; Wood
2017) and centralized bargaining coordination (Argitis and Dafermos 2013),
like Sweden. A comparison of the effects of finance on inequality between
two countries with substantially different housing finance systems and union
structures can provide important insights on whether industrial organization
and politics matter for the disciplinary impact of finance. France is selected as
a continental European economywith a liberalized labourmarket and private-
based finance, but with strong Dirigiste tradition (Clift 2006; Dutton 2002).1
Sweden is chosen as a Nordic economy with a historically coordinated labour
market (Blake 1960) and a longstanding statist-developmentalist housing
finance tradition (Johansson 1938; Schwarz and Seabrooke 2008).
The main finding of this paper is that mortgage debt increases have been
causing decreases in the labour shares of France and Sweden during the
last century. However, politics and bargaining institutions do matter as the
negative effect is substantially smaller in Sweden, where historically, wage
bargaining is centralized and the regulation of housing finance in favour of
indebted households is well established. Real share prices and stock market
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capitalization decrease the Swedish labour share as well in the historical
context. There is also evidence for positive effects of government spending
in France and for positive effects of unionization in Sweden in the historical
perspective.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the
political economy of income distribution with a focus on how finance affects
capital–labour relations and inequality. Section 3 presents key historical
stylized facts for the two countries and the empirical strategy. Section 4
reports the econometric results. Section 5 discusses the significance of the
main findings. Lastly, Section 6 concludes.
2. The political economy of income distribution
The issue of the determination of income distribution has been historically
one of themain debates in political economy since the times of Smith, Ricardo
and Marx. Due to the diversity of scholars who study such issues and the
complexity of the process itself, there is no unifying theoretical framework
for the analysis of income distribution. Different theoretical traditions centre
on different complementary channels, such as shifts in welfare spending
and collective bargaining, globalization and capital mobility, and the rising
influence of financial markets. This section briefly outlines these different
channels and discusses potential complementarities among them, with a focus
on the disciplinary impact of financialization.
Power Resources
According to the classical political economists, the principal problem of
political economy, that is income inequality, is primarily driven by labour
power resources: when workers become unionized and support actively pro-
labour political parties, they maximize their collective bargaining power
(Kollmeyer 2017; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). Collective bargaining allows
for higher minimum wages, collective wage agreements that include low-
income workers and increases in unemployment and public welfare benefits.
All these aspects decrease the cost of job loss (the difference between the
average salary and the average income of the unemployed), which minimizes
the disciplinary effect of high unemployment/underemployment on wages.
Several social scientists have presented relevant micro, meso and macro level
evidence in favour of the power resources framework.
Cowling and Molho (1982) provide sectoral-level evidence that
unionization and strike activity increased the wage share of the United
Kingdom in 1968 and 1973, while Leslie and Pu (1996) show that the
decline in these labour power proxies raised earnings inequality in Britain
over the period 1970–1993. Using survey pay dispersion data for Italy,
Belgium and Spain for the year 1995, Dell’Aringa and Pagani (2007) find
that collective bargaining institutions reduced earnings inequality. Pontusson
(2013) demonstrates that earnings inequality is lower in the more unionized
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OECD economies over the period 1975–1995. Similarly, Devincieti et al.
(2019) demonstrate that wage dispersion among male workers in Italy
from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s was determined by the degree of
centralization of industrial relations.
Focusing on themacro level, Fichtenbaum (2009) reports that union density
increased the wage share of non-supervisory workers in the United States
over the period 1949–2006. Kristal (2010) and Bengtsson (2014a) also find
robust positive effects of union density on the labour share using panel data
analysis for groups of advanced over the period 1960–late 2000s. Bengtsson
(2014b) also finds similar positive (but statistically insignificant) effects of
union density on the wage share of Sweden between 1900 and 2000. Hancke
(2012) shows that the interaction between conservative central bankers and
bargaining coordination has decreased the labour share, using a panel dataset
of advanced capitalist economies that covers the post-1970 period.
Trade Globalization and Capital Mobility
Enhanced capital mobility and trade openness has also been identified
as a potential determinant of the bargaining power of labour. Stolper
and Samuelson (1941) argued that trade openness will eventually diminish
global income inequalities. Assuming that all economies are in a stable full-
employment state, and the mobilities of capital and labour are equal to
zero, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem predicts that the abundant factor will
benefit in each case, that is capital in advanced and labour in emerging
markets. Contrarily, political economists like Rodrik (1997) have argued that
capital mobility benefits the most mobile, rather than the abundant, factor
of production. Capital mobility translates to increased exit options for firms,
that is capital owners can choose from a wide variety of options. This allows
employers to impose industrial peace, liberalize labour relations and suppress
wages under the threat of relocating production abroad. In this way, workers
in both advanced and emerging markets compete with each other to attract
investment, thus, more likely to accept lower wages triggering a relatively
uniform decrease in the labour share.
Grant and Wallace (1994) and Brady and Wallace (2000) explore this
argument for the manufacturing sector of 48 US states from the 1970s to
the late 1990s. They report econometric evidence that industrial capitalists’
decision to relocate production is triggered by increased unionization and
labour militancy, while foreign direct investment (FDI) has weakened the
organizational capacity of labour and decreased its income share. Boulhol
et al. (2011) scrutinize firm-level data for the United Kingdommanufacturing
sectors between 1988 and 2003 and report that import penetration decreased
the bargaining power of labour and the mark-ups of smaller firms.
Harrison (2002), Jayadev (2007) and Stockhammer (2017) examine the
distributional effects of globalization at the macro level, using panel datasets
that include emerging and advanced economies centring on the post-1970
era. They provide econometric evidence that trade openness, capital account
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openness and FDI have reduced the labour shares. Additional evidence is
provided by the ILO (2008) and the IMF (2017), which show that the
share of foreign assets and liabilities has decreased the wage shares during
neoliberalism.
Finance, Working Class Discipline and Inequality
Recent studies within the fields of industrial relations, politics and economics
contend that financial intermediation also plays a key role in bargaining
outcomes and inequalities. The rise of finance during neoliberalism has taken
several different forms, such as the shareholder value orientation of corporate
management, the rise in dividend and interest payments, rising financial
profits of non-financial firms and growing household indebtedness. This
element of neoliberalism has been characterized as the financialization of the
economy (Christophers 2015; Dore 2008). According to van der Zwan (2014),
studies within this field include three main areas/approaches: financialization
as an accumulation regime, financialization of corporate governance, and
financialization of everyday life (low- and middle-income households).
Despite the clear majority of the literature has a narrow focus on finance
in the neoliberal period (Christophers 2015, p. 191), authors like Hilferding
(1910), Hobson (1902), Neal (1990) and Arrighi (1994) document earlier
financial expansions, even since the fifteenth century. Neal (1990) documents
the first financial revolution in Europe back in the sixteenth century induced
by transferable, government-backed annuities in the Netherlands, France
and the United Kingdom. Building on the early literature on imperialism
and finance (Hilferding 1910), Arrighi (1994); Hobson 1902 contends
that, historically, as the old accumulation regime struggles to retain high
profitability, it shifts to the financial sector seeking higher profits. In this
regard, he associates the financial expansion of the early twentieth century
with the collapse of the old British regime, while the industrial expansion
of the Golden Age is related to the Pax Americana, that is the post-WWII
economic dominance of the United States at the international level (Arrighi
1994, p. xii). In this respect, the post-1980s shift towards finance can be
interpreted as the aftermath of the fall of the US-dominated Fordist regime.
Quantitative macroeconomic historians have also shown that finance has
been historically integral to capitalism. Jordá et al. (2017) show thatmortgages
induced financial crises in the post-WWII era, while corporate debt was
more influential in the pre-WWII period. Blackwell and Kohl (2018, 2019)
emphasize on the path-dependent evolution of national housing finance
systems since the mid-nineteenth century and classify them into deposit based
and bond based. The authors trace the origins of these credit-issuing systems
back in the nineteenth century, demonstrating that financial intermediation
has been an integral aspect of capitalism for more than a century, but with
significant cross-country discrepancies.
Thus, the rise of finance should be analysed as a multidimensional
evolutionary process, which can take different forms across space and time,
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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and not as the neoliberal financial structure. Accordingly, certain dimensions
of finance may become dominant during a regime but that does not imply
that other aspects cannot have complementary effects on investment decisions,
capital accumulation, employment relations and income distribution.
Household Finance
A key channel through which finance influences income distribution and
employment relations is the rise of household debt accumulation. The
argument that inequality may increase due to rising household indebtedness
first appeared within the Foucauldian cultural political economy literature
(Froud et al. 2002; Langley 2007). According to this approach, housing
finance has transformed investor identities, inducing working class’s self-
discipline and loss aversion behaviour due to its dependence on finance. Rising
debt commitments make workers more insecure about defaulting on their
debt, therefore, they avoid risking their employment by negotiating more
aggressively for higher wages or participating in unions.
Darcillon (2015), Meyer (2019), and Kollmeyer and Peters (2019) report
evidence that financial intermediation and the size of the financial sector
decreased workers’ bargaining power, employment protection and the
development of unions during neoliberalism. Guschanski and Onaran (2018)
show that household debt and globalization decrease the labour share, while
welfare spending increases it, using sectoral-level data for eight advanced
OECD countries (1970–2011).
Argitis and Dafermos (2013) argue that this process is path dependent, as
in economies with wide bargaining coverage workers feel safer, thus they can
act more aggressively against employers and demand higher wages to improve
their financial position. In economies with weaker labour market institutions,
the disciplinary effect of household indebtedness is stronger. Wood (2017)
claims that the degree of state intervention in domestic financial systems is
also important since, in statist-developmentalist economies, where the state
protects indebted households, the disciplinary wage effect of household debt
is moderate. He reports econometric evidence that the effect of mortgage debt
on the wage share is negative and statistically significant effects in the liberal
economies of theUnited States and theUnitedKingdom, but not in the statist
developmentalist economy of Sweden in the post-1980 period. Köhler et al.
(2019) report that the effect of household debt on the wage share is statistically
significant only in countries with weak bargaining institutions and indebted
low-income households.
As noted by Blackwell and Kohl (2018, 2019), the link between finance
and housing is not a novel development, as different housing finance systems
started developing at least since the mid-nineteenth century in several
economies, including France and Sweden (Hoffman et al. 2015; Johansson
1938). However, the impact of housing finance on factor income shares has
not been explored yet in the historical context.
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Shareholder Value Orientation
Another aspect of finance that has altered the capital–labour power relations
is the rise of shareholder value orientation in non-financial corporate
governance. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) claim that the rising influence
of shareholders in non-financial firms has made managers aim for short-term
profitability instead of long-term investments. Shareholders press managers
to increase share prices to induce higher dividend payments, that is their
income. Thus, managers increase the firm’s debt ratios to buy back shares
and retain high stock prices, which eventually worsens non-financial firms’
financial position. Consequently, managers endeavour to improve their firms
worsening financial position due to rising overhead financial payments by
workforce downsizing and squeezing wages (Froud et al. 2000; Thompson
2003). At themacro level, themore shareholder-oriented an economybecomes
as a whole, the more likely is that an increasing number of non-financial firms
will engage with the stock market, hence, stock market capitalization will rise
and contribute to a stock market boom (Kuvshinov and Zimmerman 2018).
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) scrutinize the effects of financial engagement
on different varieties of corporate governance and how these transformations
affected labour management. Palpacuer et al. (2011) focus on human resource
management for skilled workers in France during the post-2000s period
and report that the financialization of corporate governance induced the
liberalization of employment relations. Appelbaum et al. (2013) examine the
impact of private equity buyouts on labour relations based on four firm-level
case studies, showing that the financialization of those firms led to the breach
of employment contracts.
Regarding functional income distribution, Dünhaupt (2017) and Köhler
et al. (2019) use panel data analysis and provide robust macro-level evidence
that non-financial corporations’ dividend and interest payments and share
buybacks, and the stock turnover ratio, respectively, have decreased the
labour share since the late 1980s. Although this process escalated during
neoliberalism, the impact of finance on corporate governance was evident
since the pre-WWII period for many economies, including France (Carney
2006) and Sweden (Jonnergård and Larsson-Olaison 2018).
Financial Profits and Overheads
Financial liberalization and the rise in financial profits of non-financial
firms constitute another important dimension of financial expansion periods
(Krippner 2005; Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Muñoz 2019; Tomaskovic-Devey
and Lin 2011). Financial liberalization allows firms, on the one hand, to be
able to obtain cheaper business credit to fund their real investments and, on
the other hand, to expand their activity to financial investments.
Hein (2007) and Argitis and Dafermos (2013) argue that increases in
corporate indebtedness can make firms to pursue limiting wage share growth,
even if that is not used for share buybacks but for real investment. Since the
increase in business debt comes with an increase in financial overheads for
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non-financial firms, their managers are likely to attempt counterbalancing
through an equal decrease in the share of wages.
Regarding financial profits, Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) argue that
firms which shift towards the financial sector become less labour intensive,
hence, they become less dependent on labour. This relative decrease in the
importance of labour for profitability allows the rise of an economically
stable growth model with a higher unemployment rate, that is a stronger
‘reserve army’ effect that reduces the wage share. Their industry-level
estimations show that increases in financial income indeed reduced the
labour share over the period 1970–2008. Alvarez (2015) also finds that
interest payments and financial profits decrease the wage share in France
between 2004 and 2013, using firm-level data for 6,980 French non-financial
corporations.
3. Empirical design
Despite historical macroeconomic studies provide evidence that finance
has been integral to capitalism at least since the mid-nineteenth century
for several countries, none has scrutinized its impact on functional income
distribution. Thus, it is of great interest to explore: (i) if finance has been
historically a key driver of functional income distribution; and (ii) whether
the potential negative effects of finance on wage share growth are weaker
in countries with state-led housing finance systems and centralized wage
bargaining institutions. For this purpose, the rest of this paper scrutinizes the
impact of finance on the wages shares of France (1911–2010) and Sweden
(1891–2000)2 through a historicized comparative analysis.
Focusing on two case studies allows providing a more thorough analysis of
the causal relationships and institutional discrepancies, using a comparativist
approach. The two case studies have been two historically financialized
economies, but with substantially different finance systems (Blackwell and
Kohl 2018) and labour market institutions (Blake 1960). The key similarity
is that both countries were financialized with extensive housing finance
intermediation since the mid-nineteenth century, which allows exploring
question (i), while the key differences are that their financial and wage
bargaining institutions have been substantially different, which is fundamental
for question (ii).
Finance and Distribution in the Long-Run
Historically, the French housing finance model has been a private,
monopolistic, deposit-based system (Blackwell and Kohl 2018, p. 59), with
capital markets playing a central role in the pre-WWI era and after 1980.
Carney (2006) claims that prior toWWI, like the Anglo-Saxon economies, the
French financial system was primarily based on its well-developed securities
markets. As noted by Hoffman et al. (2015), in this early post-agricultural
phase, notaries played a complementary role by steering capital towards the
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TABLE 1












Business debt 21.88 65.01 69.32 35.89 16.24 31.54
Mortgage debt 4.03 12.77 29.82 26.69 29.57 50.83
Stock market
capitalization
34.02 19.40 39.17 36.55 19.46 49.29
Note: Numbers in the table are averages (% GDP) for each sub-period.
Source: Jordà et al. (2016); Roine et al. (2009).
mortgage market, which eventually attracted bank capital as well. During
the 1929–1945 period, securities markets declined globally and banks gained
relatively more power within the financial system. Nevertheless, unlike the
United States and the United Kingdom, France remained a bank-based
market under the pressure of workers and farmers until 1983, where a process
of financial liberalization reincarnated domestic capital markets. As reported
in Table 1, stock market capitalization is, indeed, substantially higher before
1945 and after 1971, while the rise of the bank-based finance system is reflected
in significant increases in both mortgage and corporate indebtedness after
1945.
In Sweden, during its early industrialization phase, between 1870 and the
early 1930s, successful family-owned firms were established, which eventually
were left to their successors. Since refinancing investment gradually became
more difficult, banks started playing a key role as shareholders and managers
of non-financial firms (Jonnergård and Larsson-Olaison 2018). However,
in the early 1930s, the state imposed financial regulation, according to
which banks could not own shares of non-financial firms anymore. Existing
shares were transferred to close-end investments funds that led to industrial
oligopolization (Hermansson 1962) and the rise of the Handelsbank and the
Wallenberg investment groups. Social democrats supported this concentrated
industrial structure under the ‘Swedish model’, which attempted to balance
growth and industrial peace by strengthening collective bargaining. Regarding
housing finance, Sweden’s mortgage banking model has been a bottom-up,
bond-based system with substantial state involvement (Blackwell and Kohl
2018). State intervention in housing finance in Sweden is based on the long-
standing Scandinavian perception of house ownership as a social right, thus,
it has been historically concerned with the provision of credit with favourable
conditions for the indebted households (Johansson 1938).
Nonetheless, since the early 1980s, a wave of financial liberalization and
declining public welfare led to a boom in the Stockholm stock exchange
market. The extensive welfare state of the pre-1980 period gave its place to
pension benefits invested in the stock market through pension funds. The
impact of financial liberalization after 1980 seems to have an effect on the
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FIGURE 1
Adjusted Labour Shares (% of GDP).
Note: Series adjusted for self-employment income.
Sources: Sweden — Edvinsson (2005); France — Piketty and Zucman (2014).
Swedish mortgage and corporate credit market since both debt aggregates
rose substantially during neoliberalism. Yet, Sweden largely preserved its
statist-developmentalist approach on housing even after 1980 (Schwartz and
Seabrooke 2008; Wood 2017) As in France, the rise in the influence of capital
markets is reflected in high stock market capitalization both in the pre-1945
and the post-1971 eras.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the adjusted labour shares of the two
countries over the full period. Both labour shares are adjusted for the income
of self-employed, which allows accounting for long-term structural changes,
such as a shift in employment from the agricultural to the industrial sectors.
As shown in Figure 1, in France, the declining trend of the labour share
in the early twentieth century was accompanied by relatively high levels of
private debt,mainly in the formof business debt.However, during the ‘Golden
Age’, the relationship between business debt and the labour share in France is
less strong, as the rapid rise of business debt seems to be relatively uncorrelated
with the labour share. Stronger correlation appears only in the transition
period between the Golden Age and neoliberalism (i.e. 1975–1985), where
the fall in the business debt ratio concurs with a 10 per cent increase in the
labour share. In contrast, the great expansion of mortgage credit provision
during the post-WWII period—and especially after the beginning of financial
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liberalization in 1983 — coincides with the stagnation of the French labour
share from 1950 to 1975 and 1990 to date.
Regarding Sweden, the expansion of business and mortgage credit over the
period 1875–1920 seems to be correlated with the decline in the labour share
during the same era, reducing from over 65 per cent to almost 55 per cent.
During the 1930–1970s ‘Swedish model’ period, the Swedish labour share
increased significantly and reached its peak at slightly over 80 per cent of GDP
in the late 1970s. In his state-regulated era, the share of private debt aggregates
was relatively lower as compared to the pre-WWI financialization and the
neoliberal eras. Eventually, in the neoliberal financial deregulation period, the
steep increase in both private debt aggregates (and especially mortgage debt)
is correlated with the fall in Sweden’s wage share from over 80 per cent to 70
per cent in the early 2000s.
Overall, the descriptive statistics for the two countries suggest that the rise
of finance is not a unique aspect of neoliberalism. Corporate finance has
been more dominant in certain eras, while housing finance played a more
central role in others. In both economies, the fluctuations in their wage shares
appear to bemore closely linked to the evolution of mortgage credit. However,
further scrutiny is necessary to unveil the direction of causality and potential
cross-country differences related to domestic institutional complementarities.
Answers to these open questions can be offered by econometric analysis.
Econometric Methodology
As a further step in the analysis of the adjusted labour shares in France
(1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–2000) presented in Figure 1, I estimate their
determinants. The estimations are based on the unrestricted Error-Correction
Model (UECM) (Davidson et al. 1978; Sargan 1964), including the short-run
(first-differenced) and the long-run (level) effects of the independent variables.
This model is used byKristal (2010) and Bengtsson (2014a) but in a panel data
context. As shown in the Appendix (Table A2), all variables are either I(0) or
I(1). According to the ADF test, the residuals of the stationary regression
between the wage share and the explanatory variables are stationary, hence,
the variables are cointegrated. Consequently, the UECM is applicable.
Given the long-run perspective of this study, the main point of interest
is the long-run coefficients, which depict the long-term structural processes,
rather than the short-term adjustments to temporary shocks. The long-run
coefficients are in lagged form in order to prevent simultaneity issues and
capture the direction of causality more precisely. Since, as described earlier,
there is no unifying framework for the analysis of the drivers of the labour
share, the approach followed is more exploratory and focuses on a variety of
channels. Thus, the baseline equation is the following:
(WS)t = α0 + α1WSt−1 + α2GCONSt−1 + α3UDt−1 + α4OPENt−1
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where WS is the (adjusted) wage share (Figure 1), GCONS is government
consumption (share of GDP),UD is union density (share of the labour force),
OPEN is trade openness (share of GDP), MDEBT is the mortgage debt-
to-income ratio (share of GDP), BDEBT is the business debt-to-income
ratio (share of GDP)3 and z is a vector that includes the short-run effects
of the variables. The terms a0 and εt are the constant and the error terms,
respectively.OPEN is the sum of exports and imports over the level of output.
(GROWTH ) (where GROWTH is (GDP)) is included among the short-
run effects to control for the cyclicality of the labour share.
Government spending is used as a proxy for welfare spending, which
decreases the cost of job loss and leads to more equal distribution through
the provision of benefits. Thus, a positive impact on the labour share is
anticipated (∂(WS)/∂GCONS > 0). For Sweden, as Lundberg and Åmark
(2001) argue that the experience of the extensive universal Swedish welfare
state model is mainly a post-1970s development (Esping-Andersen 1990)
rather than a historical stylized fact. Thereby, it is likely that the effect of
government spending will be insignificant or even perverse as the pre-Fordist
era Swedish welfare system has been based on discrimination. Contrariwise,
in France, a universal social insurance system was established since the pre-
WWII era under the pressure of social groups like the feminist movement and
agricultural workers (Dutton 2002). These events initiated the longstanding
Dirigiste interventionist state tradition of France (Clift 2006).
The second power resource indicator is unionization, which is expected to
increase labour’s income share since collective bargaining empowers workers,
especially the less privileged (∂(WS)/∂UD > 0). It is anticipated that the
positive impact in the case of France will be less strong or insignificant
since, historically, its unions have weaker institutional positions compared
to the centralized bargaining coordination of the Scandinavia. In Sweden’s
historically nation coordinated bargaining system (Blake 1960), workers are
organized in one confederation, the SwedishTradeUnionConfederation (LO)
since 1898. In contrast, the French working class is historically organized in
independent sectoral unions, with collective bargaining conducted mainly in
the firm or plant level, being closer to a liberal economy like the United States.
This means that wage legislation and employment protection has been sector
specific, which may not be necessarily reflected at the macro level. Additional
power resource variables should include the unemployment rate and strike
activity; however, relevant series of appropriate length are not available for
either country.
Trade globalization, OPEN, measures enhanced transnational capital
mobility, that is increased exit options for the firms, which ultimately translates
to enhanced bargaining power for the most mobile factor, that is capital
(Rodrik 1997). However, the pre-WWII and Fordist globalization phases
were driven by trade gains rather than by the domestic distributional conflict
between labour and capital as in neoliberalism (Palley 2018). Therefore, it is
not unlikely that, prior to the 1980s, trade globalization might have benefited
labour to some extent. OPEN is selected as a widely used indicator in the
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literature, especially among the studies that use historicalmacroeconomic data
(Bengtsson 2014b; Roine et al. 2009). Othermeasures, such as the FDI, capital
account openness or the export-import price ratio, might capture better this
channel, but data availability is limited for both countries.4
As argued earlier, the impact of mortgage indebtedness on functional
income distribution is to some extent ambiguous (Argitis and Dafermos
2013; Froud et al. 2002; Langley 2007). A negative effect would indicate
that workers’ rising financial vulnerability leads to loss of bargaining power,
thus, to declining wage shares (∂(WS)/∂MDEBT < 0). As analysed earlier,
the negative effects of mortgage debt on wage share growth are likely
to be smaller and/or insignificant in Sweden due to its state-led banking
system. Regarding the business debt-to-income ratio (BDEBT ), its statistical
significance depends on whether employers have the power to pass increases
in overhead business debt payments to workers’ wages, given the domestic
balance of power between the two.
The real short-term interest rate (INT ) is included as an additional control
variable related to households’ financial vulnerability and interest payments
related to corporate debt. A rise in it increases both household and corporate
debt payments, at the expense of workers’ bargaining power, thus, it may
lead to higher inequality through two distinct channels. Further, to test for
potential endogeneity issues with government consumption, the adjusted
wage share is replaced with the private wage share (WSP) as the dependent
variable, following Stockhammer’s (2017) formulation.5
The real stock prices index (PS) and the stock market capitalization-
to-GDP ratio (SCAP) are incorporated as rough proxies to control for
shareholder value orientation. It should be noted that they may not fully
depict shareholder value maximization, as they also capture bubbles, hence,
they are included as controls, rather than in the baseline specification.
This choice has to do with historical data availability limitations in share
buybacks and dividend payments series. Here, real stock prices and stock
market capitalization serve a signal indicator that returns in financial markets
increase, hence, themotive for non-financial firms to turn to financial activities
making more of them become involved. Even studies that cover the post-
1970s period use similar rough proxies for shareholder value due to poor data
availability (e.g. Köhler et al. (2019) use the stock turnover ratio).
To evaluate the potential positive distributional effects of the state of
democracy in the two economies, the Polity2 score (POLITY2) is included
in specification (6).6 As argued by Scheve and Stasavage (2016, 2017) in their
study on democracy and wealth shares, despite, in general, democratization
leads to more equal distribution, when the democratic process is captured
by the economic elites redistribution policies might be limited or absent. As
a means of testing additional proxies related to labour power resources, in
specifications (7) and (8), I experiment with Left executive (LEFT ) and wage
bargaining centralization (BARGAIN) from Scheve and Stasavage (2009).7
Like POLITY2, in principle, LEFT is related to pro-labour redistribution
policies. Nevertheless, given that policy agendas even within the same party
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change significantly over time, its effects might vary historically. Finally,
BARGAIN is used as an alternative to UD, which should also exhibit a
positive effect on labour’s income share. However, given that this is a time
dummy,UD is expected to capture more accurately labour’s bargaining power
through the actual number of union members and have more explanatory
power. Data sources can be found in the Appendix (Table A1).
4. Econometric results
France (1911–2010)
The estimations for France show that the two key explanatory variables
for its wage share are government consumption (GCONS) and mortgage
indebtedness (MDEBT ), which exhibit positive and negative long-run effects,
respectively. As reported in Table 2, GCONS increases the French wage share
historically, with its long-run coefficients remaining relatively stable in terms
of magnitude. More importantly, in six out of eight specifications estimated,
the long-run coefficients of GCONS are statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level. Regarding the second robust long-run effect, the coefficients of
MDEBT are negative in all eight specifications estimated. These long-run
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in (6), 5 per cent
level in (1), (3), (4) and (7), and 10 per cent level in (2). Furthermore, the
long-run impact of POLITY 2 is positive and statistically significant at the
10 per cent level, which shows that, historically, democratization has led to
more egalitarian distribution in France.
As regards the short-term effects, overall, the only variable that has
significant explanatory power in terms of magnitude and statistical
significance (at the 1 per cent level) is GCONS, whose effect is positive as
in the long-run. Also, it is worth noting that LEFT exhibits a positive (but
statistically insignificant) short-run effect. Intuitively, this potentially implies
that left-wing governments may follow their principles in the short-term, but,
eventually, they become less partisan.
Overall, the econometric results for France show that rising household
indebtedness induced working class discipline and higher inequality
historically, confirming the argument of Froud et al. (2002) and Langley
(2007). Further evidence can be found in the Appendix (Table A3), which
reports sub-sample estimations where MDEBT keeps its sign and statistical
significance both in the pre-1970 and post-1970 periods.8 Regarding
government expenditure, the findings suggest the egalitarian character
of the universal social security model, which has been well established since
the pre-WWI period (Dutton 2002), has played a key role for distribution.
The sub-sample results (see Appendix), as well as the short-run coefficients,
confirm the robustness of this finding. Finally, the small magnitude and lack
of statistical significance for the stock market indicators for France show that
its transition from market-based to bank-based finance and vice versa did
not have a major impact on capital–labour relations historically.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
582 British Journal of Industrial Relations
TABLE 2
France (1911–2010) — Econometric Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Long-run effects
WS t-1 –0.28*** –0.25*** –0.27*** –0.16** –0.25*** –0.25*** –0.14*
WSP t-1 –0.24***
UD t-1 –0.01 –0.07 0.03 –0.01 0.10 –0.01 –0.01
OPEN t-1 –0.01 –0.05 0.02 –0.01 0.05 –0.02 0.02 –0.07
GCONS t-1 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.32*** –0.07 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.24
MDEBT t-1 –0.15** –0.12* –0.16** –0.15** –0.01 –0.17*** –0.16** –0.03








(WS(-1)) 0.17 0.13 0.16 –0.10 0.11 0.14 –0.24
(WSP(-1)) 0.13
(GROWTH) –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.01 –0.01 0.00
(UD) 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.18
(OPEN) –0.02 –0.08 –0.10 –0.024 –0.04 –0.01 –0.06 –0.09
(GCONS) 2.12*** 2.18*** 1.69*** 2.19*** 1.75*** 2.30*** 1.79*** 2.07***
(MDEBT) 0.04 –0.02 0.15 0.02 –0.31 0.16 –0.14 0.12







R2 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.66 0.53 0.54 0.29
BG 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.25 0.14
Harvey 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.50 0.04 0.18 0.32 0.00
Notes: Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
In (3), the dependent variable is the private sector adjusted wage share, while in the rest, it is the
total adjusted wage share, both in first differences. Values for specification tests are p-values. BG
test at second lag. Constant terms are included but not reported.
Sweden (1891–2000)
The econometric results for Sweden demonstrate that its wage share has been
driven by four key factors historically: unionization, mortgage indebtedness,
stock market fluctuations and trade openness (Table 3). The negative long-
run coefficient of MDEBT is the most consistent finding across all eight
specifications. The magnitude of its coefficient remains relatively stable, while
it is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in (4) and (5), 5 per cent level in
(1), (2), (3), (7) and (8), and 10 per cent level in (6). The long-run effect ofUD is
also consistently positive— as expected— and robust. Its long-run coefficient
is statistically significant in five out of seven specifications. Interestingly, the
long-term impact of BARGAIN is also positive, despite it is not statistically
significant. Regarding the stock market indicators, the long-run effects of PS
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TABLE 3
Sweden (1891–2000) — Econometric Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Long-run effects
WS t-1 –0.16*** –0.14* –0.22*** –0.36*** –0.25*** –0.15** –0.16**
WSP t-1 –0.18**
UD t-1 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.03 0.04**
OPEN t-1 0.33* 0.33* 0.38* 1.03*** 1.58*** 0.18 0.36* 0.38*
GCONS t-1 –0.07 –0.08 –0.08 –0.15** –0.22** –0.02 –0.09 –0.01
MDEBT t-1 –0.06** –0.05** –0.06** –0.08*** –0.08*** –0.04* –0.06** –0.06**








(WS(-1)) 0.01 –0.03 –0.01 0.038 0.04 0.00 0.05
(WSP(-1)) 0.04
(GROWTH) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(UD) –0.16 –0.14 –0.14 –0.18* –0.29** –0.23** –0.15
(OPEN) –0.96** –0.87** –1.03** –0.51 –0.33 –0.96** –0.88** –0.90**
(GCONS) 0.22* 0.18 0.21* 0.15 0.032 0.25*** 0.24* 0.27**
(MDEBT) 0.21*** 0.19** 0.23*** 0.25** 0.25*** 0.20 0.22** 0.26***







R2 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.52 0.50 0.44
BG 0.67 0.95 0.76 0.80 0.01 0.55 0.42 0.57
Harvey 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.34 0.38 0.57 0.14 0.04
Notes: Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
In (3), the dependent variable is the private sector adjusted wage share, while in the rest, it is the
total adjusted wage share, both in first differences. Values for specification tests are p-values. BG
test at second lag. Constant terms are included but not reported.
and SCAP are indeed negative and statistically significant at the 5 and 1 per
cent levels, respectively. Finally, despite significant variation inmagnitudes, the
long-run effects of OPEN in Sweden are positive and statistically significant
in most specifications.
Regarding the short-run, two interesting results emerge: OPEN exhibits
negative and statistically significant effects, while the impact of MDEBT is
positive. The former potentially reflects short-run wage squeeze effects under
the pressure of international price competitiveness. The latter might be linked
to the positive short-term effects of obtaining an asset like a house, which,
however, eventually becomes negative as households accumulate more debt to
service their loans. Nonetheless, given that the short-term coefficients capture
adjustments to temporary shocks, their analytical value is relatively limited
and sub-sample estimations can provide more meaningful insights (Table A3).
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Notes: Calculations are based on the baseline specification (1). To standardize the coefficients,
the estimated coefficient obtained is multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation of the
explanatory variable over the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Recapitulating, the robust negative long-run impact of mortgage
indebtedness on the Swedish wage share confirms that household
indebtedness induces the self-discipline of the working class, similar to
France. Additionally, the robust positive effects of unionization demonstrate
that the historically well-established collective bargaining institutions of
Sweden have been key for wage setting at least since the late nineteenth
century. The robustness of both findings is also confirmed by the sub-sample
robustness estimations (see Appendix). Further, unlike France, the negative
long-run effects of stock market booms suggest that the pre-1930s and
post-1980s financial deregulation eras contributed to the respective labour
share declines. The positive long-run effect of OPEN provides some support
to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem that globalization can benefit the most
abundant factor. In the context of Sweden’s transition from an agrarian
to a small open economy throughout the twentieth century, this factor is
labour. Indeed, as reported in the Appendix, the effect of OPEN is positive
before 1970 and thereafter negative, which implies that as labour became less
abundant, production potentially shifted to more capital-intensive methods.
5. The comparative political economy of the labour share in historical
perspective
The main results demonstrate that finance has been decreasing the labour
shares of both countries in historical perspective. Nevertheless, these baseline
findings do not clarify whether the state-led, pro-labour Swedish finance
system affected less negatively the bargaining power of labour in historical
context. Answering this question requires to calculate the standardized
coefficients of the baseline specification (i) to make the results comparable
and explore their economic and political significance (Ziliak and McCloskey
2004).9 Table 4 summarizes the standardized long-run coefficients.
Regarding the disciplinary effects of housing finance, this study
demonstrates that mortgage debt accumulation has been increasing income
inequality in historical context. Yet, standardizing the effects shows that the
magnitude is substantially smaller in Sweden. This result provides support
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to the argument that Sweden has been historically a statist-developmentalist
economy, with the state regulating housing finance in favour of indebted
homeowners (Johansson 1938; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Wood 2017).
A state-led finance system, as in Sweden (Blackwell and Kohl 2018),
allows a more egalitarian financial development – with modest shifts in
income inequality – since either public banks issue private debt or the state
limits the power of commercial banks through pro-labour legislation. Thus,
politics clearly matter for the distributional effects of finance. Implicitly,
most studies on the rise of finance generalize the Anglo-Saxon experience
as the norm. Like Blackwell and Kohl (2018, 2019), this paper highlights
that financial development is a complex institutional process, which varies
substantially across countries and can lead to different macroeconomic
outcomes; therefore, the Anglo-Saxon-biased understanding of finance can
be misleading.
Regarding the non-financial explanatory variables, for France, the
magnitude of GCONS is larger than that of MDEBT , hence, the impact of
public spending prevails. This is consistent with Dutton’s (2002) claim that
militant social movements in France achieved the establishment of universal
welfare coverage from the pre-WWII period, which has a direct impact
on the cost of job loss. From a political perspective, this result indicates
that social conflict can shape institutions but also certain interesting policy
attitudes: While the French governments have created and preserved liberal
financial and wage bargaining systems, their attitude regarding expansionary
fiscal policy has been substantially more open-minded, even under right-wing
parties.
By the same token, the insignificant distributional effect of GCONS in
Sweden in the full period is consistent with Lundberg and Åmark (2001),
showing that the absence of organized social movements in the early agrarian
period of Sweden did not induce the establishment of an extensive welfare
state before the 1970s. As in the case of housing finance, this result suggests
that certain contemporary stylized facts, such as the Nordic welfare model,
are not historical stylized facts. Nonetheless, this finding should be interpreted
with some caution, as GCONS is a rough proxy for welfare given historical
data availability.
Regarding union density, its positive effect on the wage share of Sweden is
larger than the negative effect of mortgage indebtedness. Bengtsson (2014b)
also finds similar union density effects over the same period. Therefore,
Sweden’s centrally coordinated bargaining system since the late nineteenth
century (Blake 1960) has indeed promoted egalitarianism.
The substantial positive effect of trade on the Swedish wage share is another
interesting finding. Not surprisingly, globalization matters in a small open
economy. As shown in the Appendix (Table A3), the effect of OPEN becomes
negative only during neoliberalism, supporting Palley’s (2018) argument that
the pre-neoliberal, Embedded Liberalism trade globalization periods were not
motivated by class conflict but by trade gains, benefiting the abundant factor
of production, that is labour, as in the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. The
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opposite is true for France: trade decreases the labour share prior to 1970 and
increases it thereafter. Like financial expansions, not all trade globalization
periods have been similar across space and time.
Summarizing, the results of this paper have some interesting implications
for the comparative capitalisms literature. Focusing on two ‘non-typical’
cases, such as France and Sweden, shows that mixed varieties of capitalism
exist, thus, challenges the relevance of the standard liberal-coordinated
market economy dichotomy (Hall and Soskice 2001). Moreover, the fact
that finance is a key determinant of functional inequality historically
suggests that comparative political economy should take into account
the complementarity between financial systems and wage bargaining
coordination, fiscal policy and the distribution of trade gains to adequately
explain macroeconomic performance (Johnston et al. 2020). Finally, even
the more sophisticated debt-driven/export-driven comparative capitalism
classification (Stockhammer 2016) overlooks intra-variety diversification.
Domestic financial institutions and the distribution of trade gains vary across
countries, as in France and Sweden. Therefore, comparable debt levels and
similar degrees of trade openness can generate different macroeconomic
outcomes.
6. Conclusions
Considering finance as historically integral to capitalism, this article focused
on the macro level and estimated the determinants of the labour shares
of France (1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–2000) in the historical context,
with a focus on finance. As demonstrated, housing and corporate finance
have been vital parts of both economies since the late nineteenth century.
The econometric findings provide robust evidence that mortgage debt
accumulation has been reducing the labour shares of France and Sweden
during that period. Interestingly, the negative impact is stronger in France due
to its private-based housing finance system and decentralized wage bargaining
system. Proxies related to power resources theory, as discussed in Section 2,
like government spending and unionization, are found to be more influential
than the financial indicators in both cases, that is they are more strictly
related to the capital–labour conflict in a historical context (Table 4). Thus,
Stockhammer’s (2017) argument that financial and trade liberalization are
more influential for functional inequality in the post-1970 era is a period
specific rather than a historical stylized fact.
The key implications of this study are the following. First, finance has been
historically a key determinant of the capital–labour conflict, decreasing the
labour shares of both countries. Second, a state-led financial system along
with centralized collective bargaining institutions can indeed limit indebted
workers’ loss of bargaining power. Hence, the financial development model
of Sweden since the early twentieth century offers important policymaking
insights for small open developing economies. Third, despite financial
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variables play an important complementary role, historically, the effects of
industrial relations and welfare expenditures are dominant.
Future research on inequality should focus on the institutional
complementarities between employment relations and domestic financial
systems to adequately explain the capital–labour conflict. Further, the
development of historical macroeconomic databases that include more
sophisticated financial indicators is needed for a more detailed exploration
of shareholder maximization and financial institutions liberalization. Such
work, along with further micro-level and case study research, will allow future
studies to build a more inclusive theoretical framework for the analysis of
income distribution.
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Notes
1. Dirigisme (i.e. ‘directionalism’) refers to occasions where the state plays a central
role in setting the direction of the economy through industrial policy and the
regulation of public–private industrial relations.
2. The differences in the samples for the two countries have to do with historical data
limitations. Τhis choice aims to minimize potential biases that could have been
introduced if one decided to combine series from different sources, which may have
inconsistencies in the definitions and calculation methods.
3. BDEBT is the total credit to the non-financial sector minus mortgage debt. It must
be noted that the private debt series used (Jordà et al. 2017) include only bank
lending. This is to some extent problematic for the neoliberal period where non-
bank lending grew substantially in both economies, and for the pre-WWI era in
France, where non-bank mortgage credit was provided by notaries. However, this
is the only available historical dataset of such financial series.
4. This is the case even for studies that cover substantially shorter periods, that is start
at the early 1970s. Including only the import share is another option. Testing yielded
similar results with OPEN, thus, only the latter is reported to allow comparability
with existing studies.
5. As the government sector is, by definition, non-profitable, its wage share (WSG)
is 100%, thus, the private wage share (WSP) is: WS = (1 − GCONS) ∗WSP+
GCONS ∗WSG ⇒WSP = (WS − GCONS)/(1 − GCONS).
6. POLITY2 varies from –10 to+10, that is fromhereditary autocracy to consolidated
democracy.
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7. LEFT is a dummy variable for left- and right-wing administrations (1=left-wing
prime minister and/or president; 0=right-wing). BARGAIN is a dummy for the
centralization of wage bargaining (scale 1–3). Coding for dummies comes from
Scheve and Stasavage (2009), which is extended backwards for Sweden (1891–1920:
right-wing) and forward for France (1997–2002: left-wing; 2002–2011: right-wing)
to cover the full historical period the paper examines.
8. Estimations based on shorter sub-samples could provide a more thorough cross-
period analysis. However, this is problematic since the series include annual
observations and many ‘regimes’ were particularly short-lived, which would yield
biased estimates.
9. Coefficient variance decomposition analysis also suggests no multicollinearity
issues.
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Country Variable Period Source
France Wage Share (adjusted) 1896–2010 Piketty and Zucman (2014)
GDP (real) 1896–2010
Government Consumption 1896–2010
Exports and Imports (real) 1896–2010
GDP (nominal) 1870–2013 Jordà et al. (2017)
Total Private Debt (nominal) 1870–2013
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1870–2013
Interest rate (nominal) 1870–2013
Inflation rate 1870–2013
Stock Prices (real) 1854–2007 Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010)
Stock Market Capitalization 1930–2005 Roine et al. (2009)
Union Density 1910–2014 Donado and Wälde (2012), OECD
Polity2 Score 1875–2016 Center for Systemic Peace





Sweden Wage Share (adjusted) 1875–2000 Edvinsson (2005)
GDP (real) 1875–2000 Schön and Krantz (2015)
Exports and Imports (real) 1875–2000
GDP (nominal) 1875–2000 Jordà et al. (2017)
Government Consumption 1870–2013
Total Private Debt (nominal) 1870–2013
Mortgage Debt (nominal) 1870–2013
Stock Prices (real) 1870–2013 Waldenström (2014)
Interest rate (nominal) 1870–2013
Inflation rate 1290–2008 Edvinsson and Söderberg (2011)
Stock Market Capitalization 1930–2005 Roine et al. (2009)
Union Density 1890–2014 Donado and Wälde (2012), OECD
Polity2 Score 1900–2016 Center for Systemic Peace





Note: In several series for France, the World War periods (∼1914–1918 and ∼1939–1945) are
missing. The WWII years are missing in certain series for Sweden. Following Pepinsky (2018),
the standard listwise deletion method is applied, instead of multiple imputation, which yields
more biased and less efficient estimates when values are missing not at random (MNAR). The
only exception where observations were missing at random (MAR) is union density for France,
hence, log-linear interpolation was applied. The SCAP series start at 1929, thus, the sample for
specification (5) is 1929–2000 for Sweden and 1929–2011 for France.
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TABLE A2
Augmented Dickey–Fuller Stationarity Tests
France Sweden
Levels FirstDiff. Obs Levels First Diff. Obs
WS 0.40 0.00 115 0.72 0.00 126
WSP 0.07 0.00 106 0.34 0.00 126
GCONS 0.98 0.00 106 0.89 0.00 131
UD 0.19 0.01 105 0.31 0.00 125
OPEN 0.87 0.00 106 0.99 0.00 126
MDEBT 0.99 0.00 96 0.84 0.00 139
BDEBT 0.55 0.00 90 0.3 0.00 139
INT 0.02 0.00 103 0.15 0.00 136
PS 0.86 0.01 114 0.51 0.09 110
SCAP 0.62 0.00 78 0.89 0.00 67
POLITY2 0.00 0.00 117 0.46 0.00 142
LEFT 0.00 0.00 111 0.05 0.00 110
BARGAIN 0.85 0.00 111 0.89 0.00 110




1911–1970 1970–2011 1891–1970 1970–2000
Long-run effects
WS t-1 –0.927*** –0.788*** –0.428*** –0.404**
UD t-1 –0.103 1.051*** 0.022 0.065
OPEN t-1 –0.213* 0.168** 0.539 –0.053
GCONS t-1 1.006*** 1.358*** 0.056 –0.416
MDEBT t-1 –0.542** –0.089* –0.035 –0.170**
BDEBT t-1 0.060 –0.092*** –0.029 0.094
PS t-1 –0.190 0.002 –2.273* 0.173
R2 0.76 0.83 0.68 0.80
BG 0.29 0.17 0.23 0.08
Harvey 0.78 0.50 0.23 0.05
Notes: Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
Constant terms and short-run (first-differenced) coefficients are included in the estimations, but
not reported.
JEL codes: E44, G5, G30, J50
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